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THE NATURE AND VALUE OF PUBLIC SPACE
(WITH SOME LESSONS FROM THE PANDEMIC)
Christopher Essert*
Many people share the intuition that there is something unique and
uniquely valuable about public space. That intuition is often latent, but some
of the policies put in place in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic,
especially during the pre-vaccine period when being outside was generally
safer than being inside, brought it to the surface, along with a series of
important questions about the role of public space in a democratic society.
In this Article, I offer an account of the nature and value of public space. I
argue that public space is a unique site for people to come together as
members of the public, a place to interact in space that no private person is
in charge of. Public space is unique in being a space where no private
person can tell others how they may act. As such it realizes a distinctive
form of democratic egalitarianism, allowing and requiring us to determine
how we can and must relate as equals in space. Seeing public space as
democratic and egalitarian in this way is important for conceiving of the
proper form of its regulation, as we can see by recalling various pandemicrelated regulations. Thinking through some of those pandemic-related
regulations, as well as other more familiar parts of the legal regime
regulating public space, can help us to see more clearly the value of public
space in a democratic society.
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INTRODUCTION
Many people share the intuition that there is something special, and
especially valuable, about public space. Questions about the proper use of
public space and its regulation are always present, but in the summer of 2020,
early pre-vaccination responses to the COVID-19 pandemic had the effect
of pushing more of us into public spaces and bringing these questions to front
of mind. Take the use of beaches. Before COVID vaccines became widely
available, many municipalities and even states closed their beaches
altogether, where others kept them open with new pandemic-specific rules
put in place.1 Some people found these rules to be entirely appropriate,

1. See, e.g., Nicholas Reimann, Florida Breaks Record for New Coronavirus Cases,
Forbes (June 11, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicholasreimann/2020/06/11/floridabreaks-record-for-new-coronavirus-cases/#7ae8eb9d6d2c [https://perma.cc/Y6YF-T7CZ];
Nicholas Cousineau, Opinion: Florida Beaches Need to Close Through Summer Season,
ORACLE (June 22, 2020), http://www.usforacle.com/2020/06/22/florida-beaches-need-toclose-until-august-off-season/ [https://perma.cc/28YU-BCXW]; Amir Vera & Randi Kaye,
Jacksonville Beaches Reopen in Florida as States Begin Easing Stay-At-Home Restrictions,
CNN (Apr. 19, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/17/us/jacksonville-florida-beachreopen/index.html [https://perma.cc/5XJ8-L7PV].
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where others objected on the basis of their own assessment of pandemicrelated risk. Others still raised concerns that were different, that seemed to
be grounded on the fact that the beaches themselves were, as public space,
special. One commentator quoted in a New York Times article on Florida
beaches put it this way: “The beach is sort of this sacred space, almost, for
Florida . . . . A lot of people who grew up here think of it as, ‘That’s my
beach.’”2 And the same dynamics played out in respect of other public
spaces, like streets and parks.3 More generally, in places where schools,
workplaces, shops, and restaurants were closed, we wondered: was it okay
to go outside to the park, or to take a walk on the street? Once pandemicspecific rules about the use of public space began to emerge — rules that
asked us to stay out of the park, or to refrain from using amenities like
playgrounds, or to stay six feet from others — a new set of questions came
with them. Did these rules apply to everyone equally? Did they benefit some
more than others? As the early stages of the pandemic receded and more
familiar forms of socializing in private spaces like bars, restaurants, and
others’ homes became possible again, the intense demand for public space
started to tail off. But some of the pandemic-era innovations in the use of
public space have remained, and, more importantly, so have the questions of
principle. Public space is an essential part of our societies, and we need a
framework to think about how it ought to be created, regulated, and used.
This Article argues that the idea of public space itself can provide us with
just such a framework. Specifically, public space is a distinctive kind of
thing with its own internally generated regulative norm. In short: public
space is the public’s space. It is for doing things as members of the public,
in ways that are consistent with each other member of the public being able
to use the space in like ways.
In the basic case, this means that you cannot prevent me from walking
down the street or sitting on a bench in the park or other such uses of public
space. But by the same token, whatever I am doing in public space must not
prevent you from being able to use it, so I cannot build a wall across the
middle of the street; nor can I chop up the bench to make a fire. All of these
cases are governed by the same basic idea, an idea that says that we must use
public space in ways that are public rather than private. According to that

2. Patricia Mazzei et al., Frustrated by Crowds, Coastal States Weigh What to Do About
Beaches, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/30/us/newsombeaches-california-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/XF84-52TT].
3. See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein & Corey Kilgannon, Balmy Weekend Presents a
Challenge: New Yorkers Rushing to Parks, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/02/nyregion/weather-parks-nyc-nj-coronavirus.html
[https://perma.cc/6T2G-DMGG]; Adam Tuss, Debate Over Closing Streets for Exercise,
NBC WASH. (Apr. 8, 2020, 6:07 PM), https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/debateover-closing-streets-for-exercise/2268444/ [https://perma.cc/SAB8-4N4J].
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idea, if my use of public space is best construed as private, which is to say a
use that treats the space as if it were my own private property, then in using
the space that way I am committing a wrong. If you attempt to prevent me
from walking down the street or sitting on the bench, if you are acting as
though you are entitled to determine whether or not I may use public space,
you commit that sort of wrong. And conversely, if I use the public space in
ways that prevents you from using it, I commit the same wrong. The norm
that explains this structure is what this Article calls the “public use standard”:
each member of the public is free to use public space in a way that is
consistent with any other member of the public using space in a like way,
and, conversely, prohibited from using that space in a way that constitutes
private appropriation.
The norm regulating the permissible use of public space has a familiar
character that we can helpfully think about in terms of an ideal of democratic
equality.4 According to that ideal, we are each, as members of a democratic
society, fundamentally one another’s equals, in the sense that none is the
superior nor inferior of any other. A society that meets this ideal of
democratic equality is the opposite of a hierarchical or caste society in which
one group of people is legally defined as above or below another. Although
it is very clear that contemporary societies all too often fail to meet this ideal,
it is also clear that many take themselves to be governed by it.5 When the
ideal is applied to space, the public use standard emerges. A person who
violates the standard, as I would were I to take myself to be entitled to chop
up the park bench to use as firewood, can be understood to be setting
themselves up as entitled to use the space in a way that others could not, as
superior to those others (in respect of that space and its use).
As this Article will demonstrate, the use of public space in a contemporary
society is most typically governed by a variety of actual legal rules of various
sorts, including constitutional norms, federal and state laws, and municipal
bylaws. But in practice, those rules are often indeterminate. Consider the
basic case of a park. Park bylaws usually prohibit certain activities, while
permitting a wide range of others. However, while bylaws may clearly state
which uses are permitted, they do not typically specify how to deal with
conflicts between these permissible uses. The bylaws thus fail to address a
key issue. For example, I cannot play baseball on the field where you are
flying a kite. But both you and I are, in principle, entitled to use the space

4. See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson, What is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287
(1999) (articulating and defending an ideal of democratic equality).
5. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (“[A]ll men are created
equal.”); Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). (“[E]very individual is equal before and
under the law.”).
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for our own purposes. To resolve the conflict, we need to engage in a very
basic kind of democratic deliberation, to try to figure out a way that,6 as
members of the public, we can both use the space in ways that are consistent
with our relating to one another as equals. Perhaps I can use the space today
and you can use it tomorrow; perhaps we can divide the field in halves;
perhaps we can figure out a third activity that we would like to do together.
This simple — or even simplistic — example can be a kind of microcosm of
a lot of our thinking about public space. In public space, we meet as
members of the public and thus are presented with a site at which we can act
together as equals, a site at which we can enact democratic equality.
Moreover, public space is unique in its capacity to allow us to do this. In
contemporary societies, all space is either public or private, and in private
space there is always some private person who is, as a matter of law, entitled
to determine how others may act in it, and thus is, in a sense, in charge of
others in that space. They are the one who decides what uses of a space will
or will not be permitted.7 The point is that, in public space, we can relate as
equals in a way that we cannot do in private space: the space is the public’s
space and we, the public, need to determine how to use it in a way that is
consistent with each member of the public being able to regard it as equally
theirs, and so as equally ours.
The idea that public space is a site of democratic equality has a range of
implications that are worth exploring. Some are about the norms that govern
public spaces. Regardless of whether those norms are legally abstract and
vague and in need of on-the-ground democratic negotiation, or whether they
are more legally determinate, in order to be valid these norms must be
understandable as more-or-less concrete realizations of the abstract public
use standard. Another set of issues has to do with decisions about what
public spaces we have, where they are located, and what they look like. It is
an all-too-obvious fact about contemporary societies that the quality and
quantity of public spaces within them are not equally distributed across the
society. While these questions are always relevant, the intense demand for
public space during the (early stages of the) pandemic and the associated
innovations it generated in our use of public space: we were all outside,
taking walks, and using parks, walking and biking in spaces normally filled
with cars, and eating meals on the sidewalk. These practices and others all
6. See generally Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the
Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214 (2010) (arguing that legal standards, as
opposed to rules, are valuable in a democratic society in virtue of the way that they require
such a society’s members to engage in deliberation as to their application, and thus to reflect
on important political and moral ideas).
7. This is why private ownership presents a familiar problem of justification within a
democratic society. I happen to think that problem can be solved, but that is not our present
concern. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
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implicate the idea of public space, and that idea can help us to think about
how they can be conducted rightfully, on terms of equality.
In what follows, this Article will show how the familiar and attractive idea
that public space is the public’s space can help us to think about how we
ought to regulate the public space that we have, what sorts of public spaces
we ought to have, and how we ought to locate and maintain them. These
lessons are both timely and timeless. Public spaces were put under pressure
by, especially, the early stages of the pandemic and its effects; but that
pressure might have revealed systematic gaps in our thinking about public
spaces and in the attention that they have been given by our legal and
political institutions. Indeed, on the account this Article offers, these
questions will never not be important: public space is an essential part of a
democratic society, something that every such society needs. We will
always have reason to think about it and reason to improve it. The following
Article will provide some tools to do so.
Part I begins by characterizing the nature of public space more precisely.
Sometimes private space is contrasted with space held as “a commons,”
which is to say space that is no one’s. But public space is not a commons in
that sense, because in a commons my use of the space cannot wrong you,
whereas, as we have seen, that is not true in public space. Other times,
private space is contrasted with space held “in common,” which is to say
space that is everyone’s. But the basic case of space held in common is space
that I must have the unanimous consent of all to use, and that is not how
public space works: I do not need anyone’s consent to sit on the park bench
or walk down the street. As the common law has long recognized,
particularly through the tort of public nuisance, public space is governed by
a norm that says, first, that I need nobody’s leave to use public space — and
so it is not held in common in the classic sense of that term — and, second,
that my use must not amount to a private appropriation of the space, that is,
that it must allow other members of the public, as equals, to use the space in
a way that is like mine. In other words, public space is seen by the common
law as embodying something like the public use standard.
Parts II and III turn, with this idea of the public use standard in hand, to
articulating the distinctive value that public space brings to a democratic
society. Part II considers and critiques some prominent accounts of the value
of public space. The first sees public space as about coming together in large
groups to do things as community, about camaraderie, collective action, and
the second sees it as about encountering difference, about being pressed to
engage with members of the community that one might not otherwise meet.
Simplified, the first is about doing stuff together with those we know and the
second is about doing stuff together with those we do not. Neither view is
quite right but, drawing on a tradition that traces to the legal and political
philosophy of Immanuel Kant, we can see a perspective from which both of
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them are partly correct. This leads to Part III, which shows how public space
is about doing things as members of the public, in public. Sometimes these
things are done with friends and family and sometimes they are done with
strangers. Sometimes they are pleasant and sometimes they are more
difficult. But what they all have in common is that, because they are
happening in public space, they have a particular character grounded on the
fact that none is in charge of the space where they take place and thus none
can unilaterally determine the terms on which they happen.
Part IV turns to a range of more practical questions about public space,
and suggest some ways in which my account helps us to think through those
questions. It begins with a discussion of familiar ways we use parks and
streets, as well as some of the different ways we did those things during the
early parts of the pandemic. Next it shows how the account sheds light on
the way that systems of permits — to reserve a baseball field in the park or
construct a patio on the side of a public street — ought to operate. It then
moves to some broader questions about the different kinds of public spaces
that we need in democratic societies, about the relationship between public
space and the trespass remedy, and on the conflict between the notion of
public space and the demands imposed by widespread homelessness.
Part V considers some questions raised by this framework about cases that
seem on the borderline between private and public space. There are two
different kinds of borderline cases that deserve sustained attention. On the
one hand are privately-owned spaces that are open to the public, like malls,
coffee shops, and so on. On the other hand are so-called “privately owned
public spaces” or POPS, such as the plazas in front of office towers. In each
of these cases, we can see how we ought to regard these spaces as public in
an important sense and thus subject to the public use standard that applies to
“normal” public space.
The Article concludes with some thoughts generated by this analysis
about the relationship between public space and private property.
I.

KINDS OF SPACE

To begin an inquiry into public space, we need to think more precisely
about what public space is, about how public space differs from other kinds
of space. Examples of public space are easy to conjure: parks, streets,
libraries, and squares all stand out. But it is also easy to see that we cannot
identify public space empirically. A public library might not feel very
different from the library inside a private university. Cars operate in the
same way on public roads and private roads. Private parks, like Gramercy
Park in Manhattan, are (if you can manage to get inside) quite a bit like public
parks. The difference between public spaces and these empirically similar
non-public spaces lies in the norms that govern them. To bring this point
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out, we can examine how public space compares with some other kinds of
space.
A.

Private Space

The contrast between private and public space will be important in what
follows, so I will begin there, with an example referenced throughout.
Imagine a public park, with whatever variety of activities you take to be
paradigmatic of such a space: people sitting or walking, birdwatching or
reading, playing impromptu or organized games or sports, picnicking, and
so on. Now imagine that a generous local billionaire buys a large plot of
land, landscapes it to look just like the park you just imagined, and personally
invites each person in the neighborhood to come and use this plot just in the
same way that they would use the public park. Call this “Private Park.” How
does it compare to the public space of the park you began with?
The difference is in the nature of the norms governing the use of the
spaces. Private Park is private. That means that it has an owner — the
generous billionaire — who is in charge of the space, who gets to determine
the permissibility of others’ entering the space and interacting with it in
certain ways.8 In fact this was already implicit in saying that they “invite
each person” to use Private Park: the space is theirs, and they are letting
others use it. But their use of it is necessarily on their terms, in that there is
nothing stopping them from changing their mind, banning some activities or
even some individuals, or closing the space to guests altogether. Whatever
happens there happens subject to their control, and, as we will see below,
this partly determines its nature.9
In private space, the owner is in a position that, at least on the surface,
allows them to be, in a way, in charge of others, because it allows them to
decide how others may act in that space. How the space will be used is a
question that is up to the owner, rather than others. It is this fact that creates
a kind of justificatory burden about private ownership. What gives this
person the right, as it is sometimes said, to tell others what they can or cannot
do on a part of the earth?10 There have been many different attempts to

8. The situation is the same if the park is owned privately by a private group or
organization.
9. One might worry about this characterization of private space on the grounds that
certain private spaces — shops, malls, casinos, hotels, and so on — seem somehow less under
the control of their owners than, perhaps, homes or private offices do, in that there seems to
be a wide scope for non-owners to enter them. I will address this concern in Part V. To
preview: those spaces are all, in various ways, public accommodations, which means that they
are held out as public space, that their owners invite the public to treat them as if they were
public space. To explain that idea in full, of course, we need to know what public space is.
10. See GERRARD WINSTANLEY, THE TRUE LEVELLERS’ STANDARD ADVANCED: OR, THE
STATE OF COMMUNITY OPENED, AND PRESENTED TO THE SONS OF MEN (1649) (“And if the
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answer this question, some referring to the labor an owner (or some
predecessor) put into cultivating the land,11 others to the benefits generated
by the system of private ownership as a whole,12 still others to some kind of
connection between private property and the owner’s “personality.”13 Each
of those views has well-known problems. On my view, the way to respond
to this burden is by seeing how the rights of ownership are constitutive of a
variety of egalitarian activities and relationships that are central parts of the
lives of beings like us. That is, property helps to make up a large part of our
social world that is both necessary to our lives as we understand them and
morally attractive. Without an institution of private property rights meeting
certain regulative constraints, we could not relate to one another as equals in
respect of these parts of the social world. That would be a problem, and
solving that problem is private property’s job.14 As important as the question
is as a matter of social philosophy, whatever the correct approach to private
ownership is — that is, whatever turns out to be the theory on which it is
defensible, if defensible it actually is — need not concern us here. All these
views share, to a greater or lesser degree, a commitment to the central and
essential fact about private property, namely that, at least in the first instance,
when some space is private, some private person has the right to determine
the permissibility of others’ actions in respect of the space in question within
the bounds of the law. A full picture of the law of private property includes
various exceptions and qualifications of that fact, but the basic idea is clear
and fundamental.
The present point is just this: that is not how public space works. No
private person is entitled to determine what others may or may not do in
public space. You might not like the way I am walking down the street or
approve of the game I am playing the park, but that is simply neither here
nor there in respect of whether or not I am legally permitted to do those

Earth be not peculiar to any one branch, or branches of mankind, but the [i]nheritance of all,
[t]hen it is [f]ree and [c]ommon for all, to work together, and eat together.”); F IVE MAN
ELECTRICAL BAND, Signs, on SIGNS (Lionel Records 1971).
11. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 27 (Macpherson ed., Hackett
1980) (1689).
12. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE Bk. III, Pt. II (L.A Selby-Bigge &
P.H. Nidditch eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1739); Jeremy Waldron, ‘To Bestow
Stability Upon Possession’: Hume’s Alternative to Locke, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
PROPERTY LAW 1 (James Penner & Henry Smith eds., 2014).
13. See G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 41 (Allen Wood ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34
STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982).
14. I set out these arguments and defend them in more detail in Christopher Essert,
Property and Homelessness, 44 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 266 (2016) [hereinafter Homelessness];
Christopher Essert, Property Wrongs and Egalitarian Relations, in CIVIL WRONGS AND
JUSTICE (Paul B. Miller & John Oberdiek eds., 2020).
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things. It is in virtue of this legal difference that public and private space
differ. Private spaces have private owners who get to decide what others will
do there; public spaces do not.
B.

Negative Community and Positive Community

Although the contrast with private space is the most salient and important
to our understanding the nature and value of public space in a contemporary
democratic society, we can further advance things by comparing public
space with two other somewhat ideal types of normative organization of
space. On the one hand is a commons, or negative community, which is in
effect the name for a space that nobody owns. On the other hand, is space
held in common, or a positive community: a space owned by everyone, in
some sense, together. To avoid the confusion likely to be engendered by
using those similar but different names, I will use the terms “negative
community” and “positive community,” which I borrow from Samuel von
Pufendorf’s discussion in his Law of Nature and Nations.15
In a negative community there are no rights in respect of the space.
Anyone is free to do what they like there (subject to non-space-related
prohibitions on bodily harm and the like) and cannot be said to wrong anyone
in their use of the space. In Hohfeld’s helpfully precise terminology, we
could say that, in a negative community, there are no claim-rights in respect
of the space and everyone has a privilege to use the space however they see
fit.16 There are some affinities between public space and a negative
community. I do not need anyone’s leave to walk down the street or go to
the park, so it looks, in a way, like others have no rights in respect of my use
of public space. But looks can be deceiving. More sustained thought reveals
that there are uses of public space that wrong others. It would be wrong for
me to physically bar you from the library, to destroy the swing set in the
park, or to build a permanent structure on the sidewalk in front of my house.
The common law’s clearest recognition of this fact is in the classical
understanding of the tort of public nuisance, which says, paradigmatically,
that when one person blocks the use of the public highway, making it
impossible for others to pass, they commit a wrong.17 Put that way, the tort

15. SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 532 (C.H. Oldfather &
W.A. Oldfather trans., 1934) (1688); see also J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 85–99
(1996); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 37–46 (1988).
16. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 33 (1917).
17. See Jason Neyers, Reconceptualizing the Tort of Public Nuisance, 76 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
87, 93–114 (2017) (providing rights-based account of English law of public nuisance);
Thomas W. Merrill, Is Public Nuisance a Tort?, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 9–10 (2011) (describing “core
cases” of public nuisance). The tort of public nuisance is now understood to have a much
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seems overinclusive, since every use of space prevents some others. When
I am walking here, you need to walk somewhere else, but that fact does not
give rise to any wrong. As one court in the United Kingdom has put it,
everyone has “a right to the free and uninterrupted use of a public way,” but
(therefore) equally a “right for a proper purpose to impede and obstruct the
convenient access of the public through and along the same.”18 But each
member of the public must have equal access to public space, so rightful use
must be use that each person can systematically realize. Thus the “law
relating to the user of highways is in truth the law of give and take,” such
that interferences that are “only obtainable by disregarding” the equal right
of others are wrongs.19 Disregarding the equal right of others in this context
amounts to acting as though one is entitled to determine how those others
may act, in effect, appropriating the public space for private purposes: “A
permanent obstruction erected in a highway without lawful authority is
necessarily wrongful and constitutes a public nuisance at common law, as it
in fact operates as a withdrawal of part of the highway from the public.”20
That is, since private space is space in which one person gets to determine
how others may act, a person who acts as though they get to determine how
others may act in public space is therefore treating public space as if it were
their private space (thus “withdrawing” it from the public).

wider ambit and to be of particular interest in environmental litigation. See generally Mary
Garrells, Raising Environmental Justice Claims Through the Law of Public Nuisance, 20
VILL. ENV’T. L.J. 163 (2009); Matthew Russo, Productive Public Nuisance: How Private
Individuals Can Use Public Nuisance to Achieve Environmental Objectives, 2018 UNIV. ILL.
L. REV. 1969 (2018). On the view I am defending here, that can be made sense of if we expand
the scope of the tort to protection of public property, rather than merely public space, and
embrace a conceptualisation of the atmosphere, environment, and so on, as public property,
along the lines of the view defended by Sax. See generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471
(1970). See also David Bullock, Public Nuisance and Climate Change: The Common Law’s
Solutions to the Plaintiff, Defendant, and Causation Problems, 85 MOD. L. REV. 1136 (2022)
(offering a recent attempt to expand the scope of the tort to protect public property in the
context of climate change litigation).
18. Herring v. Metro. Bd. of Works, [1865] 19 C.B. (N.S.) 510, 525 (UK).
19. Harper v. G.N. Haden & Sons, Ltd., [1932] Ch. 298, 320 (UK).
20. Id. at 308 (emphasis added). To head off a possible confusion, I should note that when
I am standing in any spot, public or private, there is a sense in which I have made it
impermissible for you to stand in that same spot, since to do so you would have to commit
battery in moving me aside. A private owner gets to determine the permissibility of standing
in their space in a different way, that is, just by saying so. (You wrong a guest in just the same
way as an owner if you push the one or the other out of the way to get their spot.) The claim
in the text is that a defendant in a public nuisance case acts as though they can decide, by their
say so and not their mere physical presence, what others can do in the space. As we will see,
the border between those two categories can be blurry, but conceptually they are entirely
distinct.

72

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. L

Conversely, the presence of the public nuisance wrong might suggest that
public space is a positive community. There is an intuitive appeal to this
option, since it looks like there is some sense in which a group that has space
in common has it “together,” some sense in which they all have it. But
developing this thought takes some care. In (the basic case of) a positive
community each person has, in Hohfeldian terms, both a claim-right that no
other person use the space and a power to waive that right; therefore, nobody
has a liberty to use the space unless they secure the waiver of all others’
rights. In effect, each member of the community has a veto on any use by
any other member. This is not a good description of public space: I do not
need anyone’s permission to walk down the street, lounge in the park, or go
to the library.
But we should look more carefully. It may seem that individual private
use of the resources in a positive community could become permissible if we
could find, as political philosopher G.A. Cohen put it, an “appropriate
procedure” to ensure that such use is approved by all. 21 Cohen’s suggestion
about a procedure seems to raise the possibility that a community could
choose any procedure it wanted to, and the variety of legal forms of coownership might seem to confirm that thought. But that is not quite right.
Our reflections so far suggest that the idea of public space itself brings with
it a particular form that any norm of permissible use must take. On the one
hand, as we saw above, each of us is free to use public space without leave
of anyone else. This is often true even when my rightful use will make your
rightful use impossible: if I am on the swing when you want it you need to
wait until I am done; if I am blocking the intersection you need to wait for
me to clear it before you drive through. On the other hand, it is possible for
me to wrong you by excluding you from using public space in some ways,
as in the case of public nuisance.
The space between the wrong of public nuisance and the possibility of
permissible exclusion highlights how in the former, but not the latter, I act
as though I have the right to determine how you (and others) may use the
space. In slightly more everyday terms: I wrong other members of the public
when I act like our shared public space is mine, rather than all of ours. When
something is mine, it is up to me how you may act in it. In contemporary
legal systems, I can have something as mine by owning it, by having a private
property right in it. This means that I wrong you when I act like our public
space is my private space.22 That suggests that a wrongful use of public

21. G.A. COHEN, SELF-OWNERSHIP, FREEDOM, AND EQUALITY 84 (1995).
22. As everyone who has taken a Property course knows, there are other kinds of property
rights beyond ownership. Many property theorists would be happy to say that something is
mine when I am a legal tenant, for instance, or perhaps when I hold certain other so-called
lesser interests. But the details of that are outside our present area of concern. Nothing turns

2022]

THE NATURE AND VALUE OF PUBLIC SPACE

73

space is one that amounts to a claim to be entitled to treat the space as private
property. Put differently, we might say that it is ok if my use of public space
happens to interfere with your use, but that I cannot purport to be entitled to
prevent your use as a matter of right. Members of the public can be said to
be permitted to use public space when their use of it is public rather than
private, which is to say consistent with the equal right of other members of
the public to make their own like use. Conversely, what is prohibited is
anything that amounts to an appropriation of public space for private use, to
privatization. Call this the public use standard. The public use standard is
constitutive of public space: public space is space to which it applies, space
that is properly governed by it.
The public use standard says that use of public space is permissible when
that use is public rather than private, which is to say consistent with any other
member of the public using the space in a similar way. So, my merely being
in public space is entirely permissible, even when the fact that I am in public
space prevents you from being in that bit of it: I do you no wrong by sitting
on the bench so that you have to find another one, or by driving my car down
the street forcing you to slow down. But my use of the space is wrongful —
a violation of your right as a member of the public to use public space —
when it can be construed as appropriating it, which is to say when I can be
understood as using the space as if it were my own, as if it were up to me
how you could use it. Destroying the park bench is an example: in destroying
it, I act as though it is up to me to decide that you will no longer be able to
use it. Constructing a permanent structure in the public road is similar.
Rather than blocking your path temporarily by using the road in my own
vehicle, by building onto the road I would be acting like the road was mine,
and that it was up to me what you could do there.
II. WHY PUBLIC SPACE?
Given this account of what public space is, we are in a position to ask, and
eventually to answer, the following question: what good is it? As I have said,
it is clear that many of us share the intuition that public space is a valuable
part of a democratic society. That intuition is sometimes latent, but it came
to the surface during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. I will
discuss some of the forms of regulation of public space that became common
especially in the summer of 2020 below. But before the COVID circles and
quiet streets and sidewalk dining, there were more than a few instances of
public space being closed altogether with limited exceptions for essential

on that question here and that the argument is not affected by my simply talking about
ownership as a stand-in for private property rights more generally.
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uses. 23 On any view, in the face of the kind of public health emergency that
the early part of COVID constituted, such closures were permissible. Yet
even then, we saw various attempts to recreate the value of public space by
using online tools,24 or by using the air space over our streets and our voices
or instruments to join together in public.25 And as these lockdowns grew in
length, it became clear that these rather pale imitations of public space were
going to be insufficient to allow us the kinds of interactions in public that
make public space so important. The case of the beach closures with which
I began is a clear illustration of this thought, and an equally clear
manifestation of the basic intuition about the value of public space.
How, then, should we understand the distinctive value of public space?
There are a few different ways to answer to this question. One says that there
is nothing special about the publicness of public space, that we have public
space as one tool among many, including private property, to use to make
the best possible use of a particular bit of the earth’s surface. Another family
of views takes a different approach, and claims that there is something
distinctive about the publicness of public space, that there is something
valuable about it being public space as such. There are various versions of
that view, but they all share the single idea that there is something that public
space does for us that nothing else could do. This Part defends just such a
view.
A.

Public Space Instrumentalism

Property theorists in the common law world spend surprisingly little
energy thinking about public space.26 And what little work there is tends to
take what we can think of as an instrumentalist approach. On such a view,
23. You might have seen the viral video compiling clips of Italian mayors telling citizens
hanging out in public spaces to go home. Angela Giuffrida, ‘This is Not a Film’: Italian
Mayors
Rage
at
Virus
Dodgers,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
23,
2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/23/this-is-not-a-film-italian-mayors-ragecoronavirus-lockdown-dodgers [https://perma.cc/XN46-4D9N].
24. To say, as I do here, that the internet is not a substitute for public space is not to deny
the plausible thought that the internet might be an additional kind of public “space” that ought
to be governed according to its own version of the public use standard. I take it that was the
original idea of the internet. See Olivia Solon, John Perry Barlow: Will Dream of Open
Internet Die with its Founding Father?, GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/feb/08/john-perry-barlow-open-internetdream-dying [https://perma.cc/2HD3-5GAZ].
25. See Alan Taylor, Music and Encouragement from Balconies Around the World,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2020/03/music-andencouragement-from-balconies-around-world/608668 [https://perma.cc/H82J-UXYP].
26. Things are much different in civilian legal systems, which have a much more welldeveloped understanding of public ownership. See, e.g., Giorgio Resta, Systems of Public
Ownership, in COMPARATIVE PROPERTY LAW: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 216, 217–20 (Michele
Graziadei & Lionel Smith eds., 2017).
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the theorist assumes that both private and public control of space are aimed
at the same value. Then the question about whether some particular space
ought to be public or private is simply a question of efficiency, a question of
whether private or public control will maximize the relevant value.27 A
variety of familiar questions arise in this framework, concerning tragedies of
the commons, deadweight losses, and so on.
I will not argue at length against this kind of view. My goal here is to
present an alternative picture in positive terms. But it is worthwhile to notice
how this instrumentalist view is unable to make much sense of the point with
which we began, what seems to me to be the pervasive intuition that public
space is special, that the loss of public space through privatization is a serious
and significant problem and not merely a matter of efficiency. That is, we
do not tend to think to ourselves that it is simply an open question, a matter
of some sociological investigation or econometric calculation, whether we
ought to have a private person or organization in charge of our roads, parks,
streets, and so on.28 Or, at least, not all of us do. It is certainly arguable that
such an attitude is behind the massive privatization of public spaces that has
taken place in most western societies over the past generation. 29
A prominent set of recent examples involves attempts by a private
landowner to prevent access to the public beaches on the California coast
south of San Francisco.30 In many jurisdictions dating at least back to ancient
Rome, the law has treated at least some portion of the coast — usually
defined by reference to the mean high-water mark, although the details need
not detain us — as public space.31 Medieval English law allowed for public
access to the oceans as a source of food,32 but in modern times the
recreational value of beaches and oceans is clearly part of the story as well.
As the flood of news stories on the closing of beaches during the pandemic
demonstrated, a well-run beach is a unique and special form of public
space.33 If some jurisdiction has chosen, as most have, to recognize the

27. See Richard Epstein, On the Optimal Mix of Private and Common Property, 11 SOC.
PHIL & POL’Y 17, 17 (1994); see also Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom,
Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 711–12 (1986).
28. See infra Section II.D.
29. See generally BRETT CHRISTOPHERS, THE NEW ENCLOSURES: THE APPROPRIATION OF
PUBLIC LAND IN NEOLIBERAL BRITAIN (2018).
30. See Kathleen Sharp, It’s Your Beach. Don’t Let Them Hog It, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,
2018, at A21; Nellie Bowles, Court Opts Out of Ambivalent Billionaire’s Surfer Fight, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2018, at B5.
31. See Shively v. Bowlb, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
32. Which was important enough that the tort of public nuisance extended to cover it. See
Neyers, supra note 17.
33. See e.g., Adriana Gomez Licon, More Florida Beaches Announce Closures as Virus
Cases Rise, U.S. NEWS (June 28, 2020, 9:50 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/beststates/florida/articles/2020-06-28/more-florida-beaches-announce-closures-as-virus-cases-

76

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. L

beach as public space, then an attempt by a private landowner to deny access
to the beach amounts to a private appropriation,34 and our reaction to such
an appropriation seems not to be merely to ask about efficiency, but instead
to think that something special and uniquely valuable is being taken or
destroyed.
A Canadian case illustrates the same point. A group of protesters took
over a park in downtown Toronto, building semi-permanent structures and,
in effect, living there. The court’s reasoning, in finding that the City of
Toronto was within its rights to remove the protesters, notwithstanding that
their occupation amounted to a kind of protected expression, echoes the
analysis here. Private permanent structures exclude other members of the
public from the park in a way that does not amount to the kind of give and
take consistent with the equal right of all members of the public to use the
park. Rather, as the court put it, the protesters were claiming a “monopoly
over the use of the Park,” and had “appropriated public land to their
exclusive, private use.”35
Privatization of public spaces is not merely a matter of changing their
management structure. The value of private property and the value of public
space are distinct, and the move from one to another is not merely a matter
of efficiency. Privatizing public space is problematic insofar as it puts a
private person in charge of others with respect to the interactions taking place
in a space where nobody was in charge of anyone else. This account of the
problem of privatization thus echoes those accounts of privatization of other
traditional public services — education, law enforcement, public

rise [https://perma.cc/5J25-BGAZ]; Hannah Fry, Cities Race to Close Beaches for Fourth of
July Holiday as Coronavirus Surges, L.A. TIMES (July 2, 2020, 6:20 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-07-02/southern-california-beaches-closedfor-july-4th [https://perma.cc/577J-N38Y].
34. This is simplified, since the wrong is not strictly speaking enclosure of public space
but rather denial of effective access to it. The common law however has long recognized that
among the rights of private property owners is the right to physically access the land, and that
interference with the right of access is a tort — private nuisance. See J. Lyons & Sons v.
Wilkins (No. 2), [1899] 1 Ch. 255 (UK) (holding that by preventing the access of the public
to the public’s space, the private landowner is committing a wrong against the public).
35. Batty v. City of Toronto, [2011] O.T.C. Uned. 6862 (SC) para. 97, 108 (Can.).
Margaret Kohn critiques this decision as relying on a notion that the sovereign gets to decide
how to use public space so that “erecting a tent in a park is a form of privatization because it
violates ordinances that prohibit camping. This is true even if the tent is a large yurt that
houses a library and has a sign inviting anyone to come in, read a book and talk about political
issues.” See Margaret Kohn, Privatization and Protest: Occupy Wall Street, Occupy Toronto,
and the Occupation of Public Space in a Democracy, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 99, 103 (2013). On
my view, the erection of the tent is a form of privatization not because of an ordinance but
because it amounts to a claim to an entitlement to decide how the space on which it sits will
be used. Those who erected the tent purport to have the capacity to invite others in, but inviting
someone into a space is only something you can do if you have the power to exclude them.
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transportation — as problematic as a matter of political philosophy and not
merely efficiency.36 In all of these cases the role of the public is not merely
as a deliverer of something that could be delivered by anyone, but rather as
an institution doing some fundamentally public thing that nothing else can
do in quite the same way.
We should see, then, if we can find a way to vindicate the thought that
public space is distinctively valuable, that there is some special good that it
realizes in a democratic society. There have been a few attempts to do so.
B.

Coming Together

The first idea claims that public space is valuable because and insofar as
it lets us come together as a community. There is a range of ideas here, but
the basic thought is that there is something good about a space that allows
groups of people to convene, mingle, and act jointly. Think of a (prepandemic) public park, where people might play, together or alone, on the
soccer field, baseball diamond, or basketball court, or perhaps larger open
spaces for less organized activities. Or imagine children playing in the
playground or sandbox, with adults chatting, reading, or just relaxing nearby
on benches, rocks, or grass in the sun or the shade. One never knows what
is happening at the park, which neighbors you will see there, what activities
might be going on. The pleasures of participating in large scale activities are
available, as well as more solitary pursuits. And they blend into each other:
you might go there for a catch with your kid and end up playing in a baseball
game with friends, neighbors, and strangers.
This idea of coming together in public is not limited to what happens in a
park. Not all public space is for leisure. Property theorist Carol Rose,
drawing on Adam Smith, notices that public space is necessary for the kind
of “truck, barter, and exchange” that makes up much commercial activity.37
Another version of the same idea is that public space is uniquely valuable as
a site of assembly and protest. Some public space is a necessary requirement
of a right of free expression and a right of free assembly. While this is not
the place to examine the constitutional doctrines around these issues, the
basic idea is clear enough. The protection of free expression requires that
there be places where individuals are able to engage in expressive activity
beyond their own homes, since limiting permissible expression to private

36. See Sharon Dolovich, How Privatization Thinks: The Case of Prisons, in
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 128–47 (Jody
Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009); Nikil Saval, Uber and the Ongoing Erasure of Public
Life, NEW YORKER (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/dept-of-design/uberand-the-ongoing-erasure-of-public-life [https://perma.cc/KMC2-HPWE].
37. Rose, supra note 27, at 774 (citing ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 13 (Modern
Library 1934) (1776)).
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space “would certainly deny the very foundation of the freedom of
expression.”38 The case for free assembly is even clearer.
Another important public space that exemplifies this claim is the public
library. While reflexively we might think of libraries as a place to get books,
many contemporary librarians view the role of the public library rather
differently. Users of the public library find there a space — an indoor, heated
space — that is open to all, where anyone is free to surf the internet, think
quietly, read the newspaper, or work on their homework. It is also a space
where different members of the public can come together, to participate in
group activities such as book clubs, children’s reading circles, and,
increasingly, all manner of groups not necessarily related to reading at all.
A recent discussion characterizes these sorts of experiences in terms of
“camaraderie [and] the joy of watching people who hardly know one another
turn their neighborhood into a community.”39
This way of thinking about public space, it is worth mentioning, played a
very prominent role in discussions around public space and the pandemic.
When many of the alternative spaces in which we gather and in which we
are able to meet in groups were closed, when we had nowhere to go but our
homes, public space seemed to gain importance. People want to be out in
the world with other people. There is something quite important going on
here, as we will see below.
C.

Encountering Difference

A second idea of the value of public space is offered by political theorist
Iris Marion Young, who denies that our experience of the public realm is
actually one of “unity and mutual understanding”:
Because by definition a public space is a place accessible to anyone, where
anyone can participate and witness, in entering the public one always risks
encounter with those who are different, those who identify with different
groups and have different opinions or different forms of life . . . . This
helps account for their vitality and excitement.40

Young’s thought is that what happens in public space is sometimes that we
are (figuratively, not literally or coercively) forced together, and that that is

38. Comm. for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, [1991] 1 SCR 139, 155 (Can.).
39. ERIC KLINENBERG, PALACES FOR THE PEOPLE: HOW SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE CAN
HELP FIGHT INEQUALITY, POLARIZATION, AND THE DECLINE OF CIVIC LIFE 31 (2018); see also
Lisa M. Freeman & Nick Blomley, Enacting Property: Making Space for the Public in the
Municipal Liibrary, 37 ENV’T & PLAN. C: POL. & SPACE 199 (2018). Again, you might worry
here that public libraries are important primarily as a space for those who have nowhere else
to go. This is a specific instance of a broader phenomenon, which I will discuss in the
Conclusion.
40. IRIS M. YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 240 (1990).
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what is good about it. Obviously the idea that public space and free speech
are closely linked is again relevant here, since the value of free speech does
not lie in the fact that we necessarily want to hear it. There is a great deal of
writing, for example, on public space as a site for labor picketing, which can
often be quite confrontational.41
More generally, Young rightly emphasizes the importance of public space
for the possibility of meeting with those who are not obviously one’s friends.
These encounters with difference are clearly a prevalent part of the way we
experience parks and streets and libraries. As sociologist Eric Klinenberg
puts it:
[P]ublic institutions with open-door policies compel us to pay close
attention to the people nearby. After all, places like libraries are saturated
with strangers, people whose bodies are different, whose styles are
different, who make different sounds, speak different languages, give off
different, sometimes noxious, smells. Spending time in public social
infrastructure requires learning to deal with these differences in a civil
manner.42

The role of public spaces in getting us out of our “comfort zone” is surely
part of their value.
D.

A Wider View

A third idea of the importance of public space relates to these two, but is
framed in more formal terms. This is the Kantian idea that public space is
necessary for the possibility of interactions in space on terms of equality as
such.43 Legal and political philosopher Arthur Ripstein’s discussion of roads
in Force and Freedom is a helpful illustration of the idea. Ripstein argues
that a system of private ownership requires a system of public roads. The
argument is simple: without a system of roads, each person would be
“landlocked” in their particular parcel of land, unable to come and go without
the permission of a neighbor. On Ripstein’s account, this would be an
unjustified limitation on our equal freedom. It would make the possibility of
voluntary interactions between two persons dependent on the goodwill of
third parties, and so makes the two dependent on the third in a way that is
inconsistent with equal freedom. Roughly, you and I could not meet to talk

41. See, e.g., Pepsi-Cola Can. Beverages (West) Ltd. v. R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 [2002] 1
S.C.R. 156, 161–62 (Can.). But see, e.g., Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, Local No. 5,
301 U.S. 468 474–75 (1937). See also Catherine L. Fisk, A Progressive Labor Vision of the
First Amendment: Past as Prologue, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2057, 2081–83 (2018).
42. KLINENBERG, supra note 39, at 38. I take Klinenberg to mean “civil” in the sense of
“polite,” but as the discussion below will show, it really means “civic.”
43. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 6:352 (Mary
J. Gregor trans., 1999) (1791).
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or to do anything else, without the permission of my neighbor and your
neighbor and everyone else who lived between you and me. Public roads
solve this problem by ensuring that there is a path that I can take from me to
you that is not under anyone else’s control.44
Ripstein’s central claim, more precisely, is that public roads are necessary
in order for us to participate in private interactions, since we could not get
together at your place unless I can get from my place to yours. But public
space enables more than simply that kind of private interaction. While there
have been times in which the law viewed public streets as mere rights of way,
such that the public’s right was to “pass and repass” and such that any
lingering could count as a wrong, we do not now think of our roads that
way.45 Instead, we recognize that “the public highway is a public place, on
which all manner of reasonable activities may go on,” including such
“ordinary and usual activities as making a sketch, taking a photograph,
handing out leaflets, collecting money for charity, singing carols, playing in
a Salvation Army band, children playing a game on the pavement, having a
picnic, or reading a book.”46 The public space of the streets is being used
not only for people to get from one private place to another in order to
interact, but also for any type of interaction that itself takes place in public.
The same point applies more forcefully to other public spaces, like parks,
squares, and so on. The point of these public spaces is to be a place for public
activities and public interactions.
Consider again the various paradigmatic uses of public space introduced
above. There is an important sense in which what makes them the things
that they are is, at least in part, that they take place in space that is not
privately owned. When you invite me to dinner at your home, part of the
nature of our activity rests on the fact that we are in space that is yours. When
you invite me to a picnic in a park, we are doing something quite different
(even if we are eating the same meal): part of the nature of this activity rests
on the fact that the space is not mine (as against you) or yours (as against
me) but rather ours (and everyone else’s, too). Think back to the example of
Private Park. Our picnic there would be something different again because
we would be eating only with the leave of the owner. The owner’s rightful
control over the space and what happens within it would change the nature
44. See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 243–52 (2009).
45. See Harrison v. Duke of Rutland, [1893] 1 QBD 142, 160 (Eng.). To be clear, the
historical trend here is not monotonic. As Maureen Brady has noted, streets in colonial
America were viewed much more as we view our streets now, as akin to squares or parks. See
Maureen E. Brady, The Failure of America’s First City Plan, 46 URB. LAW. 507, 518 (2014)
(characterizing streets in seventeenth century New Haven as “both access corridors and places
of social engagement”).
46. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Jones & Another, [1999] 2 All ER 257, 262–63 (UK HL).
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of our activity, because it would be up to them whether and under what
circumstances it took place — they could think and talk about it as “that
picnic I let you have,” or “the picnic I hosted,” or even in some cases perhaps,
“my picnic.”
You might think that a picnic is a picnic in virtue of its being (roughly) a
meal eaten on a blanket outdoors, such that there are no grounds to
distinguish these cases. I do not deny that there is a familiar perspective —
the one we take in, say, menu planning — from which these are both just
picnics. But our choices in how to draw lines in situations like this depend
on the purposes of our inquiry. Here is an analogy. Major League Baseball
and Little League Baseball are both, in a familiar sense, baseball. But there
are differences in their rules, which, from another perspective, make them
different games. And this second perspective might be the one that matters,
depending on what kinds of questions we are interested in answering, such
“which bats may be used?” or “who is eligible to play shortstop?” The same
thought applies here. For present purposes — understanding the nature and
value of public space — what matters is not the familiar perspective from
which these are both just picnics, but rather the perspective from which,
because they take place in spaces governed by norms that are, formally,
entirely different, they are different kinds of things. More generally,
activities and interactions should, for present purposes, be understood to be
partly constituted by the rules that govern them, and in particular the rules
governing the space in which they take place.47 I will therefore set the other
perspective to the side in what follows.
In public space, part of the nature and the good of the activities and
interactions that take place there is precisely that nobody has any better claim
than anyone else to determine how the space may be used, so that a kind of
negotiation with other potential users over permissible use is a necessary
element of any use. Remember the comment about the Florida beaches with
which we began: it is true, in a sense, that each Floridian can say of the beach,
“that’s my beach”: it is not theirs in the way that something they own
privately is, but rather it is theirs as a member of the public.48 As members
of the public, we each have an equal say in how space is used.49 We share

47. See Christopher Essert, What Makes a Home: A Reply, 41 L. & PHIL. 469, 479–80
(2022).
48. Mazzei et al., supra note 2.
49. Here “everyone” must mean “members of the political community.” My park is shared
with other Torontonians (or Ontarians or Canadians), but not with American visitors. So,
when an American friend and I go to the park, there is, on my account, a sense in which they
are my guest, and a sense in which we cannot engage in the same kinds of valuable interactions
as I can with other members of my political community. (A picnic with my neighbour is not
the same as a picnic with my American friend.) I think this is a plausible upshot of my view,
as it tracks an intuition that we have some kind of quasi-ownership stake in the public spaces
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the land (and the park bench, the baseball diamond, and the tables at the
library), and part of sharing is determining how to resolve conflicting uses
on an ongoing basis. In other words, the interactions that take place in public
space have a kind of radically democratic egalitarian character to them: since
none has any right to the space in question that others do not also have, the
parties must negotiate the terms of their interactions on terms of equality,
with none superior nor subordinate to any other. That is, when members of
the public interact in public space, they must “accept the obligation to justify
their actions by principles acceptable to [one another] . . . in which they take
mutual consultation, reciprocation, and recognition for granted.”50
This formal idea of interaction in public space thus is able to incorporate
the insights of the first and second accounts of the value of public space. The
first sees public space as valuable because of its role enabling certain kinds
of cooperation and coming together. But part of what makes those comings
together valuable is that they are comings together in space that is not owned
by anyone. The second account sees the value of public space in the ways
that we sometimes encounter difference in it. Again, the thought must be
that these encounters are grounded in the very fact that nobody owns the
space: it is just because nobody controls the space that nobody can tell
anyone else to leave it and so must confront difference, diversity, and
conflict. What matters is not merely any particular substantive use, but rather
the very possibility of interaction on terms of equality in space that is equally
available to everyone. (I should emphasize that on this formal view, solitary
activities, just as much as joint interactions taking place in public space, must
be understood relationally since their nature depends on the egalitarian
relations between participants and other members of the public. Even if
nobody else knows what I am doing in public space, I am only able to do it
under the guise of the public use standard.)
III. RELATING AS EQUALS IN PUBLIC
The fact that they take place in public space is constitutive of public
activities and their value. Only public space, governed by the public use
standard, can make them available. The Private Park case shows why private
property is inadequate: the owner of the space is in charge of it, and so

of our own community that we do not have in the public spaces of other political communities.
If I heard that my local park was being privatized, I would have grounds for a kind of
resentment. Were I to hear the same about Central Park, I would more aptly feel indignant
about the destruction of some valuable thing in which I had no stake. Of course, other
democratic, constitutional, or perhaps cosmopolitan values will mean that, although my
American friend has no standing to participate in the democratic formation of the norms
governing my park, it would be wrong to exclude them from it.
50. Anderson, supra note 4, at 313.
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entitled to set the terms of any activity or interaction taking place within it.
We can picnic, play baseball, engage in expressive activity, or encounter
difference only to the extent that the owner lets us. Whatever we do in
Private Park is subject to their control. In such space we cannot participate
in those activities and interactions whose nature and value depend on their
taking place in space that is not under the control of any private person. In
Private Park, we can interact only as guests, not as members of the public.
The idea that private space is anathema to the value of these interactions
might suggest that we could be able to realize them under a variety of
alternative options. But we cannot. It should be clear that in a negative
community, where I am free to take over the space if I have the strength to
do so, we could not relate through any idea of democratic equality such as
we see in public space. Public space is, as we’ve seen, somewhat like a
positive community. The attraction of that idea is that it seems to vindicate
the thought that the space is everyone’s. But the pure case belies this —
some will be able to secure consent for their activities and others will not.51
I mentioned Cohen’s idea that an “appropriate procedure” is thus required to
govern shared space. What I have tried to argue is that, at least in the public
context, there is only one form that such a procedure could take, namely the
form of a realization of the public use standard. Below I will discuss some
more specific procedures that, on my account, need to fall under that form.
But now I want to note the centrality of the idea of the public to this analysis.
Public space is not merely shared space, it is space shared by everyone, and
necessarily so. The public is what it is not because of its size but because of
the generality in the determination of who is a member.
This marks a distinction from any other form of shared space, since any
other form of shared space, no matter how large or well-governed, must be,
on my view, private. This means that it would be unable to realize the form
of egalitarian relation that we understand to be central to the value of public
space, since an important element of that relation is that it is one that applies
to everyone in the society as such. Put differently, this is why public space
is the public’s space, since the public is the name of the organization of all
the members of society relating as equals qua members of society. The idea
is not that each of us has, as a private person, some interest in the space and

51. In a pure positive community, since everyone has a right that no others use any object
or space without consent, all uses of space would be permissible only through a strict
(unanimity-requiring) consensus-seeking process. It is doubtful that such consensus would be
reachable in any but the most limited set of cases. As Finnis notes, unanimity is “far beyond
the bounds of practical possibility in the political community.” See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL
LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 231–33 (2d ed. 2011). But even in that small set of cases, the
decisions reached would be, arguably unavoidably, biased in favor of a particular group of
members of the community, namely those who are more persuasive, eloquent, popular, or so
on.
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that all of those private interests must be collected and amalgamated, but
rather that each of us is at the same time a private person and a member of
the public, able in that latter capacity to think and act as a member of the
public, according to what Rousseau famously called the general will.52
Exactly how a public is constituted is outside my scope here, but I take it that
I can appeal nevertheless to the idea of the public understood at least in this
thin sense. The public needs to act in the public interest, which is just to say
not in the private interest of any particular member or group of members of
it, so public space must be used consistent with this idea.
In the light of these considerations, we can see why only space governed
according to the public use standard can realize the value of public space.
Each member of the public has an equal claim to public space in the sense
that each is free to try to use the space as they please, and cannot be prevented
from doing so as a matter of right by others. That “as a matter of right”
qualification is important. It means that, while the fact that you are presently
using the space — parking in that spot, playing baseball on that diamond,
sitting on that bench or at that table — might mean that I am factually unable
to do so, you cannot claim an entitlement to determine the permissibility of
the use of the space according to your say-so. Your use is limited by the
public use standard, which means that you are permissibly able to use only
so long as your use is consistent with others making like use. These typical
uses have that structure exactly: by sitting or playing or parking in the normal
way, you claim no entitlement to determine as a matter of right when I may
play, and your use presumes that I am equally entitled to the same use at a
different time.
Moreover at least many of these cases create the conditions for
interactions with strangers of a sort that seem distinctively valuable in a
democratic society. Perhaps in some cases you ought to let me join your
game of baseball or share the bench with you, allowing (or requiring) us to
interact on terms of equality, with neither of us entitled to determine the
permissibility of the other’s actions. We might understand such apparently
mundane interactions as small-scale acts of democratic politics, where we
engage in acts of “collective self-determination by means of open discussion
among equals,” in our status as members of the public, to decide how we
ought to govern ourselves in public space.53 From this point of view, public

52. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, Bk. II, Ch. 6, para. 9, 10, in THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS (Victor Gourevitch ed. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 2019) (1762); see also Kant, supra note 43, at 6:311, 6:314.
53. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 313. The importance of public space to democracy was
also emphasized by Frederick Law Olmstead, who viewed his parks as a site for the mingling
of the classes with an eye to the promotion of the sort of social ethos necessary for the
functioning of a democratic state. See Rose, supra note 27, at 779.
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space looks distinctively valuable as a site for the realization of a very
abstract idea of democratic equality, according to which none is the superior
nor subordinate of any other. By using public space according to the public
use standard, we make our status as equals real in a very direct and clear way,
as we decide how we are to live together in space in a way that is consistent
with none being in charge of any other.
The ballet of public space 54— people passing and repassing on the streets,
walking their dogs, picnicking, playing baseball in the park, standing on a
streetcorner soapbox to criticize the government or predict the end of the
world, taking turns sitting on benches or sharing tables in the library —
depends on the public use standard. Each member of the public comes to the
park, or the square, or the street, or the library, entitled to use the space, but
not in any way that others are not equally entitled. We thus bring ourselves
into a site of what we might call radical democratic egalitarianism, where we
are often required to negotiate the terms of our interactions as equals. I call
this radical egalitarianism because we interact as equals, directly, as it were,
rather than mediately through a set of rights that sometimes place one private
person in charge of others, but that are justified because each has an equal
set of entitlements, or because these positions are open to all equally, or some
other more complex feature. That is, with respect to our bodies, we are
equals not in the sense that we need to negotiate the terms of how they are to
be used, but rather because you’re in charge of yours and I’m in charge of
mine. Here, no private person is in charge. The value of public space lies in
the activities, relationships, and forms of life — in short, the myriad essential
elements of a democratic egalitarian society — that depend on this norm. 55
IV. PUBLIC SPACE IN PRACTICE
The democratic egalitarian character of public space and its value provide
us with a set of ideas that we can use to think about a range of important
questions of policy. I will consider a few in this section. Some will be drawn
from the early days of the pandemic, when, as I have said, questions about
public space seemed more salient, and others will be more timeless. For all

54. Here, I am drawing on JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN
CITIES 50 (Vintage Books ed., 1992) (1961).
55. Any particular public space might serve a variety of values. What I want to establish
is the distinctive value of these spaces’ publicness. National parks are a good thing, in part,
because they preserve the natural environment, animal habitats, and so on. Supposing that
these are goals that the state ought to pursue, there seems to be no direct reason to pursue
them through public space: we might more effectively pursue them by imposing a set of
stringent constraints on the use of private property. That said, I would not be the first to
suggest that public ownership of natural spaces can allow for a distinctive way to relate to the
members of one’s political community. See WOODY GUTHRIE, This Land is Your Land
(Folkways Records 1944).
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of these practical questions, our guiding light will be the abstract idea of
public space: when creating and regulating it, we need to ensure that public
space is capable of doing the job only it can do, allowing members of the
public engage in public activities, to relate to one another as equals.
Let me be clear, though: to say that public space is constituted by the
egalitarian ideal of the public use standard does not commit me to quietism
or any kind of pollyannish naivete.56 It is quite obvious that the public spaces
we have are not, on the ground, anything like the kind of egalitarian spaces
that they ought to be, that, as elsewhere, there is wide gulf between the ideal
that I am describing here and the reality of public space in our lives. That is
a problem, obviously. But it is not a problem for the account: it is a problem
for our societies. The failure of our public spaces to meet their egalitarian
standard is a failure of these spaces to be the sorts of spaces that they are
meant to be, and thus a failure of our societies to take advantage of the
possibility of cultivating, fostering, and promoting distinctive kinds of
egalitarian relations in public space. In short: the egalitarian conception of
public space precisely shows us what is so wrong about the public spaces
that we have, and provides a way of thinking about what we need to do to
make them better.57
A.

Regulating Public Space

Let us begin with parks and streets. Some kinds of public spaces are for
particular activities, a point I will elaborate on below. But these two sets of
examples are better understood as allowing for a wider and more open set of

56. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 598 (1958) (criticizing the same attitude of quietism).
57. Beyond the COVID-19 policies, the summer of 2020 also highlighted a different set
of issues about the use and regulation of public space. It is quite clear that laws about access
to and use of public space are, in many places and, in particular, the United States, enforced
quite unequally across racial differences. A theme of the Black Lives Matter protests taking
place across the US that summer was the way that some seem to take themselves (and are
seen by the law as) entitled to use public spaces in a way that others are not. See Sarah M.
Nir, How 2 Lives Collided in Central Park, Rattling the Nation, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/14/nyregion/central-park-amy-cooper-christianracism.html [https://perma.cc/Q6TF-CCQ4]; Taja-Nia Henderson, Living While Black: How
Black People are Policed Just for Being in Public Spaces, TEEN VOGUE (July 8, 2020),
https://www.teenvogue.com/story/living-while-black-racism
[https://perma.cc/6EEM5NWV]; Caroline Rhude, My Life in Public Spaces: How my Race Colors the Way in Which
the World Reacts to Me, LAIST (July 10, 2020), https://laist.com/2020/07/10/race-in-LA-howmy-race-colors-life-in-public-spaces.php [https://perma.cc/DA3P-UX4W]. While exploring
this in detail is outside the scope of this Article, and deserves significant discussion of its own,
we can see that, the egalitarian ideal of public space that I am offering here provides one,
although certainly not the only, way to see the wrongfulness of these racialized enforcement
practices. Public space is the public’s space, and differential enforcement communicates the
opposite. It therefore cannot be permitted.
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public activities. As I have suggested, the public use standard is meant to
guide the resolution of (potential or actual) conflicts between these activities.
There is significant value in the members of a democratic society being
required to work out, in real time, a way for them to pursue their independent
projects in a way that is consistent with their equality. This is a very common
phenomenon: I want to play baseball where you want to fly a kite, so we
need to figure out a way to work through the question of who will get to
decide what happens when we are at the park at the same time. It is easy to
see that a range of options might work here — we could try division in space,
or division in time, or perhaps we both do some third thing together. In the
spring of 2020, one site at which this point emerged quite clearly was the
sidewalk. Everyone started taking walks. And, early on, we did not know
quite how safe it was to walk close to a stranger, even outside. So, in many
places, a norm developed that called for giving others a wide berth in passing,
to maintain a social distance, perhaps by stepping briefly into the roadway.
And for the most part, this worked out fine. While some people always insist
on keeping to their path and never giving way, most of us understood the
way in which this norm did require a kind of give-and-take that is quite
consistent with the core of the public use standard, and so most of us acted
accordingly. This was an informal and unformalized expression of the idea
of democratic negotiation that is sometimes realized in public space.
But many questions about the use of public space are more complicated
than this one, and on-the-ground case-by-case negotiation is not the best way
to solve them. So, instead we have rules: bylaws and regulations. Almost
all public parks and public streets are governed by a set of more or less
determinate rules, setting out what counts, for that space, as a use of it that
is consistent with like use by others. It is hard to know where to draw the
line between cases where we can leave the question of what is consistent
with the public use standard for case-by-case determination and where we
need to set more specific rules.58 Certainly complexity plays a part here. Let
us extend the example above. It is simple enough for two or more pedestrians
to negotiate the shared use of a public way, even in the context of social
distancing. But when other forms of transportation — like bikes and
especially cars — are added to the picture, things become more difficult. It
is probably for these reasons that this period also saw the emergence of socalled quiet streets, where either lanes of traffic or entire roads that are
normally open to cars are converted to the exclusive use of pedestrians and

58. See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 379–80 (1985);
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 42–43 (1977) (describing this common
problem across the legal system about rules, standards, principles, etc.).
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bicyclists.59 By setting clear rules about the space available to pedestrians
and cyclists, some of the problems about conflicts among members of the
public can be avoided. As the pandemic developed and car traffic
rebounded, many of these sorts of programs seem to have fizzled out. I will
not say any more about that: while there are many reasons to think these sorts
of programs are a good idea, it is not clear that the idea of public space itself
can help us here.60
More abstractly, both the creation of rules for the use of public space and
their application by officials must be done for public purposes, and should
strive to ensure the fullest possible realization of the egalitarian relations
constituted by public space. The rules about what can and cannot be done in
the park or street must meet this standard, as must the actions of the officials
who enforce them. But even this requirement is very indeterminate, and can
admit of different rules in different circumstances. Here a tent is permitted
during the day, there it is not. One may park on the street on these days but
not on those. These spaces are open for free where those require a small
payment. And so on: a brief look at the municipal bylaws of any major city
in North America discloses a wide range of such rules, and comparison
across jurisdictions multiplies its size. In all cases, the rules must not allow
any private person to control the activities of others in the space, and they
should at the same time aim for the greatest realization of public space’s
distinctive value that is possible in the context.
B.

Permits in Public Space

Another phenomenon worth thinking about here is a system of permits,
where, having applied for a permit, I am able to do something that would,
absent the permit, constitute private appropriation. I am able to reserve the
local baseball diamond or to close the street off for a block party or parade.
In some municipal parks there are barbecues and sheltered picnic areas that
can be reserved, and some national park systems have provisions in place to
reserve camping sites for overnight camping. It is not hard to see what is
going on here. The public can choose to let private persons use its space so
long as such uses are consistent with the space remaining the public’s
59. See Courtney E. Martin, Slow Streets are the Path to a Better City, CURBED (May 19,
2020, 11:00 AM), https://www.curbed.com/2020/5/19/21258662/oakland-slow-streetsclosures-social-distancing [https://perma.cc/MMX4-EQ9V]; Johnny Diaz, Cities Close
Streets to Cars, Opening Space for Social Distancing, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/11/us/coronavirus-street-closures.html
[https://perma.cc/AXN5-CLB6].
60. Although it is also not clear that it cannot: we might wonder if the fact that drivers
each need much, much more public space than cyclists or pedestrians is itself a reason internal
to the idea of public space to pursue policies that limit the space cars can take up in favor of
pedestrians and cyclists.

2022]

THE NATURE AND VALUE OF PUBLIC SPACE

89

space.61 As such, we have limits on such things as the time that such uses
are allowed or their physical size. More broadly, a baseball league that gets
a permit to reserve the neighborhood diamond on Sunday afternoons would
need to hold its membership open to the public (even if subject to (nondiscriminatory) restrictions on age or ability). A permit to block the street
for a parade could not be given to a group perpetrating a discriminatory
message about the use of public space. The details would be up to the
jurisdiction in question, subject to the requirement that the permitting
process could be comprehensible as a form of regulation of the use of public
space according to the abstract norm of public use.
I have suggested a couple of times that violations of the public use
standard can be understood as attempts at a kind of private appropriation of
something that is the public’s. This is true for small scale violations: a
restaurant that attempts without a permit to enclose part of the public
sidewalk in front of it to create a patio is wronging the public by attempting
to take for its private purposes space that is held by the public for its public
use, that is, attempting to privatize public space.62 So is someone who builds
a permanent structure in the public park, or, who through non-physical
means, including forms of intimidation, purports to determine who may use
the public space. To return to a case I have mentioned already, those who
purport to have the right to control access to public beaches are committing
another version of this same wrong.63 Interesting and difficult questions
about the permissibility of the use of public space will often turn on the
interpretation of this distinction. Does a private organization’s use of the
park for a days-long ticketed concert amount to an appropriation of public
space for private purposes?64 What about the closure of the public way for
filming a movie, construction or delivery vehicles parked in bike lanes, the
use of a public pool for lessons offered by a for-profit organization, or valet
parking stands on the street in front of a restaurant? Some of these questions,
of course, will be addressed by the applicable by-laws or regime of
permitting use of public space in a given jurisdiction. As I suggested above,
61. This is the formal parallel of the idea that a private person can consent to another’s
use of their person, but that some things that cannot be consented to because they are
inconsistent with the status of the consenting agent.
62. See Harper v. GN Haden and Sons, Ltd., [1932] Ch. 298, 308 (U.K.) (“A permanent
obstruction erected in a highway without lawful authority is necessarily wrongful and
constitutes a public nuisance at common law, as it in fact operates as a withdrawal of part of
the highway from the public.”).
63. See Sharp, supra note 30; see also Andrew W. Kahrl, Free the Beach, BOS. REV. (May
21,
2018),
http://bostonreview.net/class-inequality-race/andrew-w-kahrl-free-beach
[https://perma.cc/RT6X-WVFM].
64. See Thomas Honan, These Parks Are Our Parks: An Examination of the Privatization
of Public Parks in New York City and the Public Trust Doctrine’s Protections, 18 CUNY L.
REV. F. 107, 107–09 (2015).
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though, while there is a wide scope for discretion in terms of democratic
decision making about what counts as public use of public space, the
decision must be structured by the abstract prohibition against appropriation
of public space for private purposes. Most permitting regimes can plausibly
be read as consistent with this, as they require permitted private uses to be
temporary, limited in scope, and so on.
In this context, we can explore one phenomenon that arose during the
early stages of COVID-19, but seems like it may be here to stay in many
places, namely the proliferation of sidewalk and street-side patios outside of
restaurants in urban contexts. In many cities, including the one I live in, the
early days of COVID-19 saw a push to allow restaurants and bars to set up
patios on public sidewalks and streets.65 Before vaccines were widely
available — and even after they arrived — sitting outside was safer than
sitting inside. So even when indoor dining was prohibited, patio dining was
permitted. And then many jurisdictions decided to allow restaurants and
bars, following a permitting process, to open patios on sidewalks and on the
sides of public streets, typically where cars would park. It is easy to see why
this was popular: when there was nowhere else to eat, these patios provided
a venue. But the appeal was evidently deeper than that, given that the
practice of such patios has persisted even as indoor dining has become
possible and, at least in some places, is on its way to becoming permanent.66
How should we think about these programs? On the one hand, they are a
clear instance of a permitting system, in that they allow (or I guess I should
say permit) private parties to use public space on a quasi-exclusive basis. If
you are not a customer of the bar or restaurant, then you aren’t meant to sit
on the patio, and it is easy to surmise how certain members of the society —
those with financial means, those with the inclination to dine our — will be
more advantaged by these programs than others. And the scope of the

65. See Rob Ferguson, Ontario Restaurants and Bars Now Allowed to Expand Outdoor
Dining
and
Drinking
Spaces,
TORONTO
STAR
(July
3,
2020),
https://www.thestar.com/politics/provincial/2020/07/03/ontario-restaurants-and-bars-nowallowed-to-expand-outdoor-dining-and-drinking-spaces.html
[https://perma.cc/LW4WRKGP]; Fritz Hahn, To Expand Dining Options, Restaurants Take to the Streets, WASH. POST.
(July 10, 2020, 11:20 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/goingoutguide/to-expanddining-options-restaurants-take-to-the-streets/2020/06/24/fb8ac7b6-b617-11ea-aca5ebb63d27e1ff_story.html [https://perma.cc/5FGD-94NB].
66. For the details of the Toronto program, see CaféTO – Outdoor Dining, CITY OF
TORONTO, https://www.toronto.ca/business-economy/business-operation-growth/businesssupport/covid-19-cafeto/ [https://perma.cc/2TGU-25T2] (last visited Oct. 24, 2022). For the
New
York
City
program,
see
Open
Restaurants,
N.Y.C.
DOT,
https://www1.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/pedestrians/openrestaurants.shtml
[https://perma.cc/V462-XWTF] (last visited Oct. 24, 2022) (“Due to the success of the
emergency Open Restaurants Program during COVID-19, New York City is working to create
a permanent Open Restaurants program.”).
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exclusivity here seems pretty broad: whereas I can typically reserve the
baseball diamond for the afternoon, here the patio spaces are dedicated to the
private use for much of the summer.
Still, these are arguably differences of degree rather than of kind: as the
comparison above suggests, we do permit certain kinds of exclusivity in
these permitting regimes — our local Little League can use the park’s
diamond exclusively most nights over the summer — and, as I will discuss
in the next Section, we have many public spaces that are intended for
particular uses which may appeal to some members of the public more than
others. I think the most pressing question specific to these programs might
be about the nature of the public space that is turned over to the private
parties. On the one hand, sidewalks are arguably among the most open and
democratic public spaces; on the other, curbside parking spaces already, it is
worth saying explicitly, privilege a certain subclass of the public over others.
And it also seems relevant that a particular bit of space can be used by more
members of the public as a patio than as a parking space — four or six can
sit in the space of a single car, so arguably the patio is a more public use of
public space. Finally, we probably should not discount the more ephemeral
and intangible effects of these patios, as they arguably — or at least in my
experience — can have the effect of generating a kind of positive externality,
what we might call a “buzz,” that makes the experience of public space more
dynamic and exciting, perhaps even more public, in a way that extends
beyond the patios themselves. A street with patios is one that seems
obviously to more fully realize the kinds of coming-together and
encountering difference in public space that we discussed in Part II. All that
said, as these programs do seem potentially here to stay, it might be worth
exploring, as some cities seem to be, the potential that these spaces might
serve the value of public space even more effectively by being transformed
into a variety of non-profit, fully public uses, as in the conversion of parking
spaces to parkettes and the like.67
C.

Constructing Public Spaces

When it comes to questions of what public spaces we should have, where
they should be, and what they should be like, a related but distinct set of
ideas must be taken into account. Although the idea of public space is
formal, public space as we experience it is not. Public space is not typically
an empty wilderness. Rather, it is something that we need to construct, to
achieve, both physically and normatively. To ensure that all members of the

67. See CBC News, Cabbagetown Turned a Parking Space into Parkette to Support Local
Business, CBC (July 3, 2022), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/cabbagetownparkscape-toronto-1.6509387 [https://perma.cc/3WWD-22HC].
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public can interact as equals in public space, the state must provide physical
conditions that make this possible. Public streets, libraries, and parks must
not be sites merely for the physically or neurologically typical to move, read,
or play, but must provide spaces, materials, and facilities sufficient to ensure
usability by everyone on terms of equality.68 And the same is true for
physical location: public space must be physically located across a society
to ensure that each member of the public has a degree of access to a
sufficiently wide range of different kinds of public space to allow them to
understand themselves as the equal of each other member of the public in
respect of their access to their shared space. Putting good parks in rich areas
and bad parks in poor areas is not consistent with seeing all the public space
as shared by all members of the public.69
Implicit in these examples is another point. Different public spaces are
suited to different kinds of public activities. A state can and should impose
regulations that recognize this. In all cases, the regulations must strive to
ensure that the members of the public using the space can relate on terms of
equality and that none can determine the permissibility of another’s use. But
just what that means will depend on the context. The physical and normative
conditions that make a good park are different than those that make a good
library and different again than those that make a good street. Moreover,
different instances of these various types can and should be differently built,
to allow for a variety of kinds of interactions across smaller and larger
geographic areas. This park is for reading and walking, that one for

68. Another COVID-specific example here: the circles painted or chalked onto the ground
in parks, set up so that only members of one family or bubble could socialize together. These
were, clearly, a significant restriction on the permissibility of using public space. But, from
the point of view of the degree of scientific knowledge available during the summer of 2020,
one can see their justification and see how clearly it fits into the egalitarian account of public
space I have offered. These circles provided a rule about the use of park space that applied in
the same way to each member of the public, so that disputes over use can be resolved on terms
of equality in that none has a claim to the use of the space that others do not also have. They
did so, importantly, at the same time that they allowed for what was thought at the time to be
the maximum safe use of the space. Because there was a relatively high degree of uncertainty
around what did and did not count as safe use of public space like a park, some members of
the public — the young, the healthy or at least those who took themselves to be healthy, those
with high risk tolerance — felt entitled to use the space in ways that others — the elderly,
those with compromised immune systems — reasonably understood as exclusionary, they
saw those using the park as claiming that their use was to be allowed. In other words, if the
park was monopolized by those who seemed at the time to be foolish risk takers, more
responsible members of the public were left unable to use it; by contrast if rules are imposed
that govern use to make riskier behavior impermissible, the space becomes more available for
use in a manner that is consistent with the public use standard.
69. See Nina Lakhani, Millions of American Lack Access to Quality Parks, Report
Reveals,
GUARDIAN
(May
20,
2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/may/20/park-inequality-accesscoronavirus-wellbeing [https://perma.cc/BBZ3-8Y57].

2022]

THE NATURE AND VALUE OF PUBLIC SPACE

93

skateboarding and baseball, another for young children, and yet another for
large group picnics. Here again the abstract idea of public space structures
the form of activities and interactions that are permissible but allows for a
wide range of variation in its realization.
To illustrate these ideas more concretely, notice that, while I have
concentrated here mostly on parks and streets, beyond these cases lies a
whole variety of other kinds of public spaces that are necessary for a whole
variety of other public activities. Think about public education or public
transportation, public museums and art galleries, public monuments and
memorials, and even the sites of government themselves. The identification
of a space as for one or another of these activities, and the associated
imposition of regulation to that end are both within the scope of the
permissible public purposes I have in mind here and can be thought to be
effective to the extent that they promote egalitarian relations appropriate to
the sort of public activity in question. And, as the previous example
suggests, there are also difficult questions about which sorts of public spaces
should be favored, and how to choose among options if we cannot have all
the public space we want. These are important questions, but for the most
part cannot be answered by the idea of public space itself: instead they turn
on a range of other political and legal considerations that we cannot explore
here.
D.

Trespassing in Public Space

This broadened conception of a public space, including government
buildings, schools, and so on, introduces another important question, about
the relationship between public space and the trespass remedy. It is generally
taken for granted that public authorities are entitled to exercise the trespass
remedy, which is to say to demand that individual persons leave some space
on pain of being held to be liable in trespass (civilly or even criminally).70
But on the account I am offering here, we have reason to question this.
Trespass makes sense in respect of private property because the entire point
of private property is to give the private owner the capacity to determine how
others may act on the property, whether they may come or go, and so on, a
capacity “to exclude anyone at all for any reason.”71 But in public space, as
I have stressed, there is no person who has the capacity to tell others how
they may or may not act; indeed, the egalitarian account of public space
offers just the opposite picture. As the discussion of bylaws above suggests,
there is nothing inconsistent with the egalitarian picture of public space with

70. See, e.g., Trespass to Property Act, R.S.O. 1990, T.21 (Can.); N.Y. PENAL L. §
140.00(5), 140.05.
71. Uston v. Resorts Int’l Hotel Inc., 89 N.J. 163, 170 (1982).
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creating specific, determinate rules about what activities may or may not take
place there. It is, in short, perfectly permissible to have rules that prohibit
certain activities (playing baseball) in certain public spaces (the legislature;
the mayor’s office; the library). The point now is just this: those rules are
justified on the basis of the purpose of public space. When someone violates
one of those rules, they can be asked to stop their activity or even to leave
the space in question, but such demands will be grounded on the purpose of
the allocation of the public authority over the space and thus responsive to
the familiar public-law restrictions on the exercise of public power. In other
words, public power is not unconstrained in the way that private owners’
power over the private property seems to be, so the exercise of the trespass
remedy needs always to be subject to public law review on the grounds of
the reasonableness of its exercise.72 That sounds like a mouthful, but it is a
familiar idea: the security guard at the legislature cannot simply demand that
you leave on the grounds that he is in charge, nor can the legislators. You
have, at least in the abstract, just as much a right as they do to be there. At
the same time, of course, exclusions can be justified on the very grounds in
question. The security guard can demand that you leave the legislature
because it has closed for the evening, because public purposes limit who may
access certain areas where sensitive business is conducted, or so on.
E.

Sleeping in Public Space

Those considerations lead helpfully into the consideration of another
major issue that arises in thinking about the regulation of public space. In
many contemporary societies, where homelessness is running unchecked and
largely unaddressed, the only place that the homeless are free to be is public
space. This is, quite obviously, a moral catastrophe, and, as I have argued
elsewhere, the justification of any private ownership of space is conditioned
on the state’s ensuring that each member of the society is provided with some
space of their own so as to make homelessness impossible.73 But that is not
the world we live in, and much of the on-the-ground advocacy on behalf of
the homeless has focused on the need of the homeless to use public space.
Litigation has centered on the constitutionality, in the face of homelessness,
of municipal rules prohibiting the erection of permanent and semi-permanent
structures, notably including tents, in public parks. It is easy to see why those
rules are in place and normally justified: the erection of such a structure in a
park is close to a paradigmatic violation of the public use standard, as we
saw above.

72. What standard of review would apply in different public law regimes is a question I
leave to the side.
73. See Homelessness, supra note 14, at 290.
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But matters seem more difficult when the occupant of the structure is
homeless. I am inclined to think that the courts have been correct to be
sharply critical of these prohibitions,74 but we need to think carefully about
the explanation. One reaction to the reality that the homeless are often
required to be in public space because they have nowhere else to be is to
argue that we ought to shape and regulate our public spaces to accommodate
the homeless.75 As important as addressing the problem of homelessness is,
we should note that this sort of approach is very much non-ideal with respect
to what it can offer the homeless, what it can do to our public spaces, and its
effect on our public understanding of these issues. With respect to the first
point, the simple fact of the matter is that, however lax our regulation of
public space usage by the homeless could be, the homeless would still be
homeless and as such unable to enjoy all the important things that those with
homes are able to enjoy. That is, private space, too, uniquely makes possible
a wide range of important and valuable activities and relations, and the best
explanation of the wrong of homelessness locates it in the way that the
homeless are unable to access these goods and the consequent inequality.76
In short, allowing the homeless to use public space does not come close to
solving homelessness. With respect to the second point, which is to say the
effect of relaxing the application of the public use standard in the face of
homelessness, my central point has been that public space is uniquely
valuable and that, to maintain that value, some regulation of that space
according to the public use standard is necessary. The question that
homelessness poses to us is about how to approach this conflict. Regarding
the third point, it is not, I think, inappropriate to notice the way that
suggestions that the homeless be able to use public space more freely tend to
let the state off the hook in terms of its failure to address the massive injustice
of homelessness while at the same time creating a rhetoric that cheapens
public space and that may thereby tend to lead to our losing sight of its central
value and failing to devote sufficient attention and resources to it.
Interestingly, though, as we press down into the details of the judicial
decisions on these questions, one can see how courts aim to attend to these
kinds of considerations. A rule that says that one cannot build a permanent
structure in the park seems more reasonable, on public law grounds, and thus
easier to justify, than a rule that says one cannot set up a tent for the night.
Sleeping in a tent overnight is in many cases hard to characterize as
inconsistent with the possibility of use by others of the space in question, and

74. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 2019); Victoria (City) v.
Adams, [2009] 313 D.L.R. (4th) 29 (Can. B.C. C.A.).
75. See Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REV. 295,
315 (1991).
76. See Homelessness, supra note 14.
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so might be thought to be a reasonable use of the space that is consistent with
the public use standard. COVID arguably made the presence of the homeless
in public spaces more salient — since the risk of transmission in shelters was
high enough to cause many people who would otherwise have used them to
sleep outside instead — and, at least arguably, in the early days might have
shifted the risk calculation in the direction of permissibility. 77 But I do not
think any new principles apply here: the question — a difficult one, to be
sure, is about how to reconcile the proper value of the use of public space
with the state’s failure to meet its obligations in respect of homes.
This raises a more abstract issue that is raised by this phenomenon, which
ties these practical questions back to the broader issue of the nature and
justification of public space. Policies that tend to incentivize the homeless
into sleeping in parks seem to disclose a certain attitude toward public space
according to which it is simply the leftover space into which the state can
freely dump whatever policy problems it cannot effectively deal with. The
sidewalk patios are a bit like this, too. In each case, there is a question about
how to pursue some important public purpose, a purpose that is arguably not
directly tied to the nature and value of public space. The instrumentalist
conception of public space that I noted, and rejected, earlier, suggests that
public space, lacking any distinctive value of its own, might be a good spot
to do stuff that is better done on private space if the costs and benefits happen
to turn out in the relevant way. But this treating of public space as a dumping
ground degrades its value, both practically — by literally putting things into
public space that the state refuses to deal with elsewhere — and, just as
important, in principle, as it obscures the way in which public space is
distinctively valuable and appropriate for distinctively public activities.
There is much to say here, and further work, outside our present context, is
needed to fully explore these intricacies.
V.

QUASI-PUBLIC SPACES

I want in this Part to consider a slightly different set of questions from
those we have been looking at so far. The account of public spaces I have
offered here might seem to exclude some kinds of spaces that we think of, at
least to some degree, as public. I have in mind two slightly different sorts of
spaces. First, shopping malls and other privately owned spaces that are “held
open to the public.” And second, so-called privately owned public spaces
(“POPS”) such as plazas in front of office towers. Both of these types of

77. See Estair Van Wagner & Alexandra Potamianos, Cities Must End Homeless Camp
Evictions During the Coronavirus Pandemic, CONVERSATION (June 9, 2020, 10:18 AM),
https://theconversation.com/cities-must-end-homeless-camp-evictions-during-thecoronavirus-pandemic-139285 [https://perma.cc/7S28-XVQW].
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spaces can be understood as public spaces, in a way, although they are strictly
speaking privately owned. In this part I will explore that claim.
A.

Open to the Public

According to a view one finds in at least a subset of the discussions of
public space in the literature on urban planning or sociology, my
understanding of public space counts as cramped and underinclusive.78
These discussions privilege in their thinking about public space not its legal
status but something like our experience of a space. They are thus inclined
to count as public a set of spaces that are, strictly speaking, legally private,
such as shopping malls. In this Part I will show how my account of public
space suggests an approach to these phenomena. The basic idea is that these
spaces are held open to the public for public use and that therefore the public
ought to be able to so use them.
The common law has long recognized certain privately owned and
operated businesses as so-called public accommodations. Since the Middle
Ages, innkeepers have been under an obligation to let an available room to
anyone who offered to pay for one, and common carriers to carry the goods
of any who asked and paid.79 One relatively well-accepted explanation for
this rule is that “the business of an innkeeper is of a quasi public character,”
that a common carrier is “in the nature of a public officer.”80 The application
of this type of rule depends on the nature of the service provided: an
innkeeper must provide an inn to anyone who asks, a farrier must shoe the
horse of anyone who needs their services, and so on. Whatever the service
is, the traditional rule was that “one that has made profession of a public
employment, is bound to the utmost extent of that employment to serve the
Public,” which is to say, “one who assumed a public office was bound to
perform the duties of such office, and to perform them properly.”81 We can
then apply this idea to something like a shopping mall. The argument takes
two steps. First, we recognize that a mall is, like many other businesses, held
open to the public, so that its owner cannot refuse the custom of any

78. For example, see MARGARET KOHN, BRAVE NEW NEIGHBORHOODS: THE
PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC SPACE (2004).
79. See White’s Case (1558) 73 Eng. Rep. 343 (K.B.); see also Charles K. Burdick, The
Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service Companies, Part I, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 514,
515 (1911); Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and
Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1307–10 (1996). There are some who reject this
account of public accommodations; while I do not have the space to discuss this, I suspect
alternative explanations of the core of this doctrine could, mutatis mutandis, be extended to
the case of malls in a way parallel to the treatment I propose below.
80. De Wolf v. Ford, 86 N.E. 527, 529 (N.Y. 1908); Ansell v. Waterhouse (1817) 6 M &
S 385 (UK). To the same effect, see R v. Ivens (1835) 173 Eng. Rep. 94, 96.
81. Lane v. Cotton (1701) 88 Eng. Rep. 1457, 1465; Burdick, supra note 79, at 521.
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particular patron. The second step of the argument is more centrally related
to the rest of this Article, and rests on the claim that the purpose of a mall is
to allow the public access for use, basically, as public space. As one court
put the point in discussion of this issue, when it comes to a mall, “access by
the public is the very reason for its existence.”82 Moreover, the public is
invited not merely to shop but to do quite a bit more — wander the common
spaces, hang out, drink coffee, walk for exercise or to soothe a crying baby.
In effect, to treat the common spaces of the mall like they are a public street
or square.83
Put more directly, the claim is this: malls are held open to the public for
public use as a form of public space. They are, if you like, doubly public
accommodations. While innkeepers are filling a public office and
performing a public service, and thus bound by a different set of standards
than mere private owners, the operator of mall is distinctive in that the
content of the service they are providing is itself public: they are inviting the
public to use their privately owned space as if it were public space. This
invitation, made as it is to the public, brings with it an obligation to provide
their public service properly. And in this context that means a severe
restriction on their right to exclude those users doing things of the sort that
are typical of public space. Importantly, both forms of publicness are
necessary. An entirely private space that looks like a public space but is not
open to the public (like Private Park) should not be treated as public space.
Conversely an inn is open to the public but not as a public space. Just as in
the case of genuine public space, what uses are permitted will depend on the
nature of the space. The basic thought in the case of a mall is that a mall is
like a street, which means that activities appropriate to a public street (such
as those listed above and crucially including a wide range of expressive
activity) would be permissible, but activities better suited to a park (like
sports or picnics) likely would not.
Bringing these thoughts to bear onto the doctrine more directly can
illuminate the problems that arise in the caselaw as follows. Earlier, I
mentioned that taking the public use standard seriously means that the tort
of trespass ought not to apply to public space in the normal way: rather than
public authorities having the power to invoke trespass for any reason or no
reason at all, as private owners do, public authorities must do so only for
public purposes properly tied to the reasons for which they have control over

82. Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp v. Bakery & Confectionary Workers’ Union, Loc. No.
31, 394 P.2d 921, 924 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1964); see also Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592
P.2d 341 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1979).
83. To the same effect, see N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle East v. JMB Realty
Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 761, 772–73 (N.J. 1994).
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the land. In short, they need to have at least a rational basis for doing so.84
If malls and other spaces held out to the public are, as I argue, to be treated
as public space, the same analysis should apply to them. That means that
any given such space is entirely permitted to have rules about how it may or
may not be used, but such rules must be tied properly to the nature and
purpose of the space. Mall owners cannot, therefore, invoke the trespass
remedy, as the Canadian Supreme Court memorably put it, “in all its pristine
force,”85 but should be able to provide at least a rational basis for any rules
excluding certain kinds of uses of their space. Put differently, we might say
that owners of spaces held out as open to the public “have a duty not to act
in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner toward persons who come on their
premises,” a duty which applies “to all property owners who open their
premises to the public,” because such owners “have no legitimate interest in
unreasonably excluding particular members of the public when they open
their premises for public use.”86 A rule that says that baseball cannot be
played in a shopping mall should meet that standard, since even mall owners
can exclude anyone if they “disrupt the regular and essential operations” of
the space,87 but a rule prohibiting peaceful labor picketing should not.88 And,
as I noted last paragraph, this calculus would apply differently in the case of
other spaces held open to the public, like stores or cafes.89

84. See supra Part IV.A.
85. Harrison v. Carswell, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 200, 206 (Can.).
86. Uston v. Resorts Int’l Hotel Inc., 89 N.J. 163, 173 (1982). The reference to
discrimination here invokes a set of considerations beyond the scope of this Article. In brief,
the wrongfulness of discriminatory exclusion from public spaces is overdetermined: it is not
going to be justified on the analysis in the text above, and it is going to be unjustified on the
basis of a more general norm prohibiting state discrimination.
87. Id. (citing State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 566 (1980)) (quoting Princeton University
Regulations on solicitation). The Uston case is about the exclusion of a blackjack card counter
from a casino, and it is at least arguable that the permission to exclude can cover a case such
as that.
88. This is a way of understanding the holding in PruneYard that “There is nothing to
suggest that preventing appellants from prohibiting this sort of activity will unreasonably
impair the value or use of their property as a shopping center. The PruneYard is a large
commercial complex that covers several city blocks, contains numerous separate business
establishments, and is open to the public at large. The decision of the California Supreme
Court makes it clear that the PruneYard may restrict expressive activity by adopting time,
place, and manner regulations that will minimize any interference with its commercial
functions.” See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980).
89. See Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & Com. Workers Union Loc. 8, 290 P.3d
1116 (Cal. 2012) (declining to extend the rule about expressive activity in malls, in part by
noting that a grocery store differs from a mall in precisely this respect). This point could be
developed further to vindicate the thought that a sort of private business including (but not
limited to) cafés and bars counts as a kind of public space, as suggested by elements of
Habermas’ theory of the public sphere. See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS
SOCIETY (Thomas Burger & Frederick Lawrence trans., MIT Press 1989) (1962). See also
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This explanation brings with it an important qualification. The public’s
permission to treat a mall as if it were public space — and thus a permission
to engage in a variety of public activities — rests on the owner’s holding the
space out as open to the public. This is not a matter of the subjective
intentions of the owner; rather it is a matter of applying the abstract idea to
the particular way in which the space is or is not presented as open to the
public, as public, with reference to objective features such as open doors, no
restrictions on entry, and so on. But this invitation to the public is, itself,
revocable: a mall owner can freely and non-wrongfully change its hours, or
close it in emergencies, or tear the mall down and replace it with a private
home.90
B.

Privately Owned Public Spaces (POPS)

I said that malls and similar spaces are subject to the public use standard
only because their private owners hold them open to the public and that an
owner can freely decide to change the use of their space and make it entirely
private. But there are other private spaces that are open to the public that are
not like that. An increasingly prominent phenomenon in many urban centers
is the so-called POPS. As I will use the term here, I mean it to invoke spaces,
such as the squares in and around office buildings and condominiums, which
are created by private developers either as part of a quid pro quo with a public
agency, typically a municipal government body, according to which the
developer is allowed to build beyond the default planning requirements of a
location in exchange for setting some land aside that is open to the public, or
more directly as a condition of any building in certain areas.91
These spaces are like malls in that they are privately owned land that is
open to the public. Unlike malls, however, their being open to the public is
not optional, in the sense that it is not a choice of the private owner. A mall
is held open to the public as public space, and while it is so held open
members of the public cannot be excluded and (I argued) they ought to be

RAY OLDENBURG, THE GREAT GOOD PLACE: COFFEE SHOPS, BOOKSTORES, BARS, HAIR
SALONS, AND OTHER HANGOUTS AT THE HEART OF A COMMUNITY 32 (1999) (identifying the
sociological idea of a “third place”). These sorts of spaces are, we could say, held open to the
public to use for a certain set of public activities, in particular various forms of discussion and
debate. The argument here would suggest that patrons of such establishments should have a
wide latitude to engage in even unpopular forms of speech, while nevertheless being
prohibited from, say, playing basketball.
90. Many of the mall cases involve claims based on freedom of speech or expression.
These cases might raise other constitutional issues — issues about the possibility that
constitutional values might somehow apply to relations between private persons, the idea that
is sometimes referred to as “horizontality” — that we cannot explore here.
91. For an example of the former, see N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RES. art. 3, ch. 7, § 37-70
(2007); for an example of the latter, see S.F., CAL., PLANNING CODE, art. 1.2, § 138 (2021).
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able to treat it as if it were public space. But the holding open to the public
of the space is an exercise of the mall owner’s private authority, and there is
nothing stopping the mall owner from exercising that authority differently,
and closing the mall to the public or tearing it down. By contrast, a POPS is
open to the public because it is required by the operation of the relevant legal
regime. That is, the owner of the POPS does not have a choice as to whether
or not the space is open to the public. Thus, a POPS should be seen to count
as genuinely public space in the sense that I am concerned with here, which
is to say that its use ought to be governed by the public use standard. The
difference between a POPS and a more traditional public space, like a
publicly owned park, is just the difference between the state carrying out its
public function through its own means and the state requiring some private
persons to carry out those public functions for it, in effect deputizing them
as public officials.
One point this analysis brings out clearly is that public space and private
property are not, strictly speaking, opposing categories. Some genuinely
public spaces are on private property.92 What matters here is that the space
is, as a matter of law, meant to be open to the public, and not that it is
privately owned. Thus if the space, as many are, is designed to act like a
public park or square, then it should be treated by the law as a public park or
square. That means the private owners should not be entitled to exclude
those they deem undesirable, that restrictions on expressive activity should
be impermissible, and so on.93 Relatedly, municipalities ought to require as
conditions of these sorts of arrangements that the physical structure of the
spaces effectively communicates to the public their openness, so that the
members of the public who are said to have rights in these spaces can
properly understand the existence of those rights. That is, fences and other
forms of exclusionary design should be discouraged or forbidden, and
inclusive design should be encouraged. The point is that a member of the
public ought to be able to know by looking at the space that it is meant to be
a public space, since it is their space, as a member of the public, and to

92. Many such spaces are created by the practice whereby a private owner “dedicates”
some land for public use as a street, square, or park by creating what is in effect an easement
in favor of the public for the use of the land but retaining the underlying title. See JOSEPH K.
ANGELL, THOMAS DURFEE & GEORGE F. CHOATE, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HIGHWAYS § 132
(2d ed. 1868). At common law, a similar result could also be reached by prescription, where
members of the public used some space as a public way — that is, consistent with the public
use standard rather than for their own exclusive private purposes — for a sufficient period.
93. The New York Zoning regulations do go some distance to imposing requirements
along these lines. But in many cases the practice does not meet the ideals of the theory. See
generally Sarah Schindler, The “Publicization” of Private Space, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1093
(2018) (offering a comprehensive discussion of these issues, and POPS more generally);
Winnie Hu, Please, Don’t Have a Seat, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2019, at A22 (detailing a
discouraging recent survey of the situation on the ground).
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require them to investigate its status fails to allow them to relate as an equal
to those members of the public (the developers, say) who know the status of
the space.94
CONCLUSION: DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC SPACE AND PRIVATE SPACE
To close, I want to consider one upshot of the analysis here that is harder
to resolve. An important feature of this analysis is that public space and
private property cannot be viewed as interchangeable means for the
achievement of a single end. Rather, they do two different things, and help
to realize two different sets of values. The difficulties I want to mention here
revolve around the question of how to weigh these values against one
another. In short: there is only so much space to go around. What are we to
do with it, what should be private, and what should be public? A state is
obligated to ensure that each person has sufficient private property in order
to ensure their ability to relate to everyone else in the jurisdiction on terms
of equality (with respect to property). Something similar is true of public
space: its value, I have argued here, rests on its capacity to uniquely realize
a more radical form of democratic equality. I suggested that these things are
valuable because of the special way they contribute to an ideal of democratic
equality. This suggests that we need public space to be created, distributed,
organized, and so on in a way that aims to ensure this egalitarian ideal. That
means, in simpler terms, that we cannot just put the nice parks in the rich
areas, but rather that everyone should have relatively equal access to
relatively equal public spaces in order to allow them to participate in public
space as equals.
Still, questions persist. If the state is obligated to provide “enough” private
property and “enough” public space, how is it to decide how to balance its
provision of each? The claim that private property and public space do
different things, that they enable different kinds of valuable interactions,
means that there is no a priori way to answer this question. Different states
can make (and have made) different permissible choices. That said, there
may be reasons to prefer additional provision of public space over private
property. For one, it seems plausible to suppose that the benefits of public
space continue to increase as the amount of it increases in a way that does
not hold for private property. The more parks and libraries and museums we
have, the more valuable public activities we can engage in; the billionaire’s
fifth home does not seem to generate as compelling of a moral return. For
another, a society richer in public space than private property might prevent
the sort of retreat of the rich to private property leading to a lack of political
attention to public space as well as be more likely to produce interactions
94. See generally INTERBORO, THE ARSENAL OF EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION (2017).
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among classes and, in turn, the sort of egalitarian ethos that many think is
central to a properly functioning democracy. The increased demand for
public space during and after the pandemic has helped to bring these
questions to the surface and has helpfully generated a range of conversations
about them. However these questions are to be approached, the hope is that
a clear understanding of the nature and value of public space such as offered
here can only help to resolve them more clearly.

